In June 1986, the opposition Polish magazine Kultura, published in Paris, featured an article by the renowned science fiction writer Stanislaw Lem titled "The Lesson of Catastrophe," written shortly after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Below is a brief excerpt from that article.
"Thanks to a series of circumstances, we were given the opportunity to see how the Soviet Union responds to a large-scale nuclear catastrophe, which became a sort of simplified model of the consequences of a nuclear strike.
One might have expected well-organized and prompt actions aimed at extinguishing the fire, preventing further releases of radioactive materials, and taking therapeutic and preventive measures to save the population. Such actions would seem obvious to the entire world, which views the USSR as a superpower, primarily a military one, capable of and prepared for waging nuclear war. Such a war would involve both offensive and defensive operations, and those conducting it must be prepared not only to launch nuclear strikes but also to withstand them on their own territory.
It is well known that the Soviet Union has a significant offensive potential in the form of guided missiles placed in fortified underground bunkers and on submarines. However, the reaction to the Chernobyl disaster demonstrated that the USSR is unprepared to endure nuclear strikes. If this were not the case, it would have significant stocks of means to counteract radiation exposure, as well as well-organized groups of anti-radiation, reconnaissance, evacuation, and medical services. Yet immediately after the catastrophe, the Soviets turned to the West, asking not only for experts but also for medicine! It turned out that "the emperor has no clothes!"
From a political standpoint, this might be understandable, as this system has always moved toward the "bright future" through sacrifices. Even the mention of the existence of military units specialized in nuclear defense appeared in Soviet propaganda only on the fifth or sixth day after the disaster.
It is evident that neither the civilian authorities nor the military were prepared for the deadly contamination of large areas of their own country with their own nuclear materials. What we witnessed can be explained by the fact that Soviet nuclear power was primarily designed for offensive use, rather than defense. It served as a tool of intimidation, blackmail, and psychological pressure on the West, rather than a means of conducting real warfare.
The absence of adequate defensive means proportional to their offensive capabilities becomes understandable in this context. However, such conclusions have not yet been drawn by any Kremlinologists.
As for my personal opinion, I assert that there is a vast disproportion between the offensive and defensive nuclear potential of the Soviets, making the USSR highly vulnerable in the event of a nuclear war initiated by a first-strike strategy."
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