Canada / July 27, 2024
1918-1921: The Struggle of Georgian Diplomacy for the De-Jure Recognition
of Georgia and the Consolidation of Georgia's Borders
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen,
First and foremost, I would like to apologize for not being able to be with you in person here in Tbilisi. Unfortunately, my schedule did not permit me to travel at this time, so I am delivering my presentation using contemporary internet technologies.
The goal of this presentation is to explore the diplomatic efforts of the First Georgian Republic (1918-1921) aimed at achieving international recognition and securing the territorial integrity of the newly-formed Georgian state, which was proclaimed on May 26, 1918, after more than 100 years of interrupted statehood, amidst a ravaging world war, the collapsing Russian Empire, revolutionary chaos, and an Ottoman Turkish invasion. While current historiography primarily focuses on the political and economic development of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, as well as on military and ethnic conflicts within and around it, the diplomatic endeavors of Georgian representatives abroad remain a vast and under-studied field.
At the same time, allow me to take the liberty of stating that the success of any newly-born state, or a state restored after a long period of foreign occupation and domination, is determined by at least three factors: the political will of the nation, its military might, and the effectiveness of its diplomacy on the international stage.
As for the political will of the Georgian people, it must be acknowledged that the majority of Georgians never stopped dreaming of restoring their nationhood. Understandably, the most educated and informed segment of society was reluctant to sever all ties with the once-mighty Russia because, despite Russia's systematic attempts to fragment Georgian historical and ethno-linguistic territory, restrict the use of the Georgian language, and assimilate Georgian culture, it once provided what the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov described as “the wall of friendly bayonets” — a wall that protected the country from less tolerant and more alien empires.
However, by the end of the spring of 1918, this "wall of Russian bayonets" had crumbled. The Russian Empire had ceased to exist, and the soldiers of its once-mighty imperial army were rapidly leaving the Caucasus front, fleeing back to Russia proper. The drama of Georgia's situation was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike other former subjects of the fallen Russian Empire (e.g., Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, or Ukraine), who were facing conquest by the German Empire — a culturally similar power that did not pose a threat of massive loss of life and property — the Georgians were threatened by the advancing Ottoman armies and had no choice but to be deeply concerned about their physical survival.
They were well aware of the fate of the Armenians, who had already fallen victim to genocide at the hands of Ottoman Turkey, and had little reason to believe that the Ottoman policy towards Georgians would be any different in the event of a Turkish military occupation of the whole country. The dramatic events that occurred, for example, in Akhaltsikh County in March-May 1918, where not only local Armenians but also Christian Georgians fell prey to Ottoman troops and Muslim irregulars, left little hope that the Christian population of the rest of Georgia would be treated any differently in the event of further Ottoman triumph. In fact, it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the events in Akhaltsikhe County in the spring of 1918 could be qualified as an attempted ethnic cleansing of Christian Georgians—an attempt that, fortunately, was repelled.
The “military might” of the newborn Georgian Republic could be described as next to negligible. Georgian armed forces were relatively small and still in the process of formation. Due to Russian imperial policies, most Georgian soldiers with combat experience were deployed on other fronts of the World War, leaving newly formed military units lacking in both experience and initial motivation, especially until the fall of Batumi and Akhaltsikhe in April and May 1918. However, it should be noted that without military strength, no independence movement can succeed, even with political will and skillful diplomacy. Furthermore, according to mankind's historical experience, treaties concluded with weaker parties are often not honored by aggressive empires.
To substantiate this assertion, one need only examine the internationally recognized borders of modern Georgia, including Abkhazia and what is sometimes referred to as South Ossetia, to see that these borders were established precisely where Georgian troops halted or were forced to halt between 1918 and 1920.
Returning to the armed forces of the First Republic, we can observe that by the end of spring 1918, they were gradually becoming stronger and more effective, although this vital process progressed slowly.
However, even with sufficient military might, no newborn or restored state can be successful without the meticulous work of diplomats aimed at establishing stable peace and securing territorial integrity. This was precisely the task faced by Georgian diplomats from 1918 to 1921, many of whom, despite being brilliantly educated and fluent in languages, lacked experience in international diplomacy. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that most of them did their best and achieved certain successes. Among them are notable figures such as Akaki Chkhenkeli, Zurab Avalishvili-Avalov, Michael Tsereteli, Grigol Uratadze, and a few others whose roles in the establishment and consolidation of the First Georgian Republic can hardly be underestimated.
The first important, if not crucial, achievement of embryonic Georgian diplomacy was undoubtedly the conclusion of the Treaty of Poti on May 28, 1918, and the establishment of bilateral German-Georgian relations, which proved quite effective until the end of the World War.
The situation Georgia found itself in at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Poti was truly critical. The newly-born country was at war with Ottoman Turkey, whose forces had already occupied a significant part of Georgia and, despite the Turkish defeat in the Battle of Choloki (April 20-21, 1918), still had the potential for further expansion. Furthermore, from the northwest (from the direction of Abkhazia), the sovereignty of Georgia was threatened by the armed forces of Soviet Russia, which had already concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, and had no intention of recognizing the independence of the South Caucasus states.
The Georgian government initially wished to remain loyal to the Entente, and this desire was mutual. However, the Entente powers' forces were too far away and thus unable to protect Georgia from the Turkish invasion. In this almost catastrophic situation, it was vital for Georgia to quickly find another power capable of saving the newly resurrected Georgian state. The only real power capable of resolving the crisis at that moment was the German Empire.
It goes without saying that Germany had its own national interests in the Caucasus at that time, and it was precisely these interests that Georgian diplomacy was able to leverage. The conclusion of the Treaty of Poti and the entry of German troops into Georgian territory put an end to Turkish expansion and gave Georgia a critically needed respite.
Of course, we must also mention the Treaty of Batum, signed on June 4 (just six days after the signing of the Treaty of Poti with Germany) between the Georgian Democratic Republic and the Ottoman Empire. It is self-explanatory that it is difficult to speak of any successes in Georgian diplomacy in this context. Essentially, the Turkish delegation dictated the terms of the treaty to their Georgian counterparts—terms that were much harsher for Georgia than those of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. In addition to the Batum area, Georgia lost two more counties of the Tiflis Province: Akhaltsikh and Akhalkalak, with the clear message that there would be no further discussion of these terms.
Given the uneasy circumstances that included Ottoman military supremacy in the region (although diminished after a series of defeats) and the limited possibility of German interference, the Georgian and Armenian delegations had no choice but to accept all Turkish demands, thus buying peace for their territories. However, even under these circumstances, the Georgian delegation managed to negotiate a minor territorial concession in the county of Akhaltsikh: the towns of Abastuman and Atskhur.
Meanwhile, immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Poti, the Georgian diplomatic mission, consisting of Akaki Chkhenkeli, Zurab Avalishvili-Avalov, and Nikoloz Nikoladze, set off for Berlin for further negotiations on establishing cooperation with the German Empire. The intensive work of Georgian diplomats in Germany, which continued for over five months until Germany exited the war on November 11, 1918, yielded significant results. In this context, it is worth quoting Zurab Avalishvili, who wrote in his memoirs: "The most important thing is that Georgia and the Caucasus have entered into European history and politics. The Russian provincial phases of her existence have come to an end!"
Georgian diplomatic mission in Berlin (July, 1918)
When discussing specifics, it can be said that during this period, Georgian diplomats achieved de facto recognition from Germany and Turkey, with the prospect of de jure recognition by all the Central Powers. This was also reflected in the Additional Agreement to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed between the German Empire and Soviet Russia on August 27, 1918, whereby Soviet Russia essentially recognized Georgia's independence de facto in exchange for several vital concessions from Germany.
Furthermore, a certain guarantee of the territorial integrity of the newly formed Georgian state was achieved, with borders that, while not entirely fair from a Georgian perspective, were sufficient to begin building a stable statehood. Declassified correspondence between Georgian diplomats and representatives of the German Foreign Ministry, Otto von Lossow and Richard von Kühlmann, reveals that the German Empire considered the Treaty of Batum illegitimate because it was concluded only with Turkey and not with all four Central Powers. As a result, a conference in Constantinople was planned to resolve this conflict. Additionally, the correspondence indicates that Germany recognized an independent Georgia within the entirety of the Tiflis Province, as well as the Kutais Province, including the Sukhumi District, but excluding the separated Batum area (the latter corresponding to the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk).
As a result of the German-Georgian policy of cooperation, German troops stationed in Georgia effectively shielded the Georgian Republic from further Turkish encroachments, which occurred even after the signing of the Treaty of Batum. It is well known that many countries have violated treaties they signed, but in the political culture of some non-European countries, there is generally no obligation to respect agreements made with a knowingly weaker party. Accordingly, within days after the signing of the Treaty of Batum, Ottoman Turkish troops "tested the strength" of Georgia's borders in the Borchalo County. The Turkish invasion aimed at Tiflis at that moment closely resembled the contemporary Russian policy of "hybrid warfare": while ordering their troops to advance, the Ottoman government claimed that no Turkish troops were involved in the incident and that the offensive was allegedly being carried out by "local Muslims."
On June 10, 1918, the Turkish invasion of the Borchali District was repelled by a joint counterattack by Georgian and German forces, resolving the incident. Notably, this was the only instance of a military confrontation between two Central Powers.
Moreover, the German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine) provided military assistance to Georgian forces in repelling Soviet Russian invasions in the Sukhumi District and during the Georgian counteroffensive in the Sochi and Tuapse districts of the Russian Black Sea Province (August-September 1918), including landing operations in Sukhumi and Adler. It should be noted that Georgian diplomats were against the invasion of the Sochi and Tuapse districts, rightly believing that it would cause conflict with the anti-communist Armed Forces of South Russia under General Denikin's command. However, Georgian military leaders (primarily General Giorgi Mazniashvili and National Guard commander Valiko Jugheli) deemed the occupation of these two districts necessary to ensure Georgia's border security. Additionally, the population of these districts (mostly non-Georgian) had become disillusioned with both Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik Russian authorities and repeatedly expressed a desire to join the Georgian Republic.
Georgian and German diplomats also worked extensively to establish economic relations between the two countries.
The situation started changing in the fall of 1918 when it became clear that the Central Powers were unable to win the war, largely due to the entry of the United States into the conflict and the arrival of US armed forces on the Western fronts. Georgian diplomats working in Germany at that time quickly reacted to the changing situation and began "building bridges" with the Allies by approaching French and British plenipotentiaries in neutral Norway.
The end of the fall of 1918 posed new challenges to both the Georgian state and Georgian diplomats in light of the surrender of the Ottoman Empire on October 30 and the German Empire on November 11 to the victorious Allies. Consequently, the recognition of Georgia by the defeated powers became null and void, forcing its representatives in the West to restart the struggle for acceptance into the family of world nations from scratch. At the same time, the Georgian state found itself in the midst of territorial disputes with nearly all its neighbors, including Russia (both "White" and "Red"), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and later, Nationalist Turkey.
On December 13, 1918, Georgian representatives arrived in London to start negotiations regarding the recognition of their country’s independence. During the same period, similar goals were pursued by delegations from other countries that had seceded from Russia after the fall of the empire, including but not limited to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. However, even the de facto recognition of such “new formations” by the victorious Allies could not be easily achieved due to the prevailing belief in late 1918 and early 1919 among the chief European powers in the restoration of pre-Bolshevik Russia, which, after all, had been their ally in the Great War. Consequently, all the states that declared their independence by the end of 1918, with the exception of Finland and Poland, were seen as breakaway Russian provinces that would eventually need to reintegrate into a future federal Russian state. Facing this attitude, the representatives of the new states had to work extremely hard to change the stereotypical perception of their status and to seek international recognition. Georgia, in particular, faced the additional challenge of its recent “collaboration with Germany,” despite the fact that without this “collaboration,” Georgia would have had little to no chance of surviving until the Allied victory.
Nevertheless, on March 14, 1919, the Georgian delegation submitted a memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference in which Georgia applied for international recognition of its independence and specified its territorial claims. Based on historical and geographical considerations, the government of the Georgian Republic claimed the provinces of Tiflis and Kutais, the territory of Batum, the districts of Zakataly, Ardahan, and Olti, small portions of Kazakh and Elisavetpol counties between the rivers Kura and Iora, portions of the two adjacent Turkish vilayets (Trebizond and Erzurum), and most of the district of Sochi up to the river Makopse (see Map 1). While submitting the memorandum, the heads of the Georgian delegation, Nicholas Chkheidze and Irakli Tsereteli, emphasized that these were not maximal claims of their government because “the Republic had acknowledged the importance of certain historic Georgian territories to its neighboring states.”
Map 1
Map 2
The memorandum received a rather chilly reception in Paris. Some of the territories included within the moderated limits of the Georgian state were also claimed by other parties who considered them unequivocally theirs. This was not a big surprise for the Georgian leaders, who were, in fact, prepared to make further concessions. The question regarding the portions of the Turkish vilayets of Trebizond and Erzurum remained unresolved until the end of 1920, as some of that territory was also claimed by Armenia and Pontic Greeks. The status of Batum also remained unresolved until the early summer of 1920. In addition to the above, Georgia also had unresolved territorial disputes with Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Allied policy, these disputes were to be resolved between the governments of the three self-proclaimed Transcaucasian states with minimal external involvement.
The question of Georgia's state borders was undoubtedly important and needed to be resolved. However, the diplomats of the new democracy faced another major obstacle in their pursuit of even de facto recognition of independence. This obstacle was the work of Russian representatives at the Conference, who acted on behalf of key anti-Soviet factions of the Russian Civil War, including the government of Admiral Kolchak and General Denikin’s Volunteer Army, also known as the Armed Forces of South Russia (AFSR). These Russian anti-Soviet leaders had the support of a majority of the diplomatic corps of the fallen Russian Empire in Europe. The experienced and charismatic Russian diplomats, such as former Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Sazonov, ex-Premier Prince George Lvov, former Chairman of the Duma Alexander Guchkov, and Russian Ambassador to France Vasily Maklakov, had direct contacts with many Allied leaders and were well-known to them. In contrast, the Georgian representatives were new to the West and lacked foreign policy backgrounds or experience.
Although Russian emissaries in Paris and other European capitals could not entirely halt the process of international recognition for the new states formed from the disintegration of the Russian Empire, they were able to slow it down by making the Transcaucasian issues part of “the Russian question.” They also succeeded in persuading the Allied Powers to impose severe limitations on the territorial ambitions of the new state formations. It would not be an exaggeration to say that Russian anti-Soviet diplomats were working in tandem with the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow regarding the territorial claims of the new independent states. Coordinating its efforts with General Denikin, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Office declared on December 24, 1918, that it would not recognize Georgia as an independent state. This declaration starkly contradicted the fact that less than four months earlier (August 27, 1918), the Soviets had signed an Additional Agreement with Germany, Article 13 of which stated that the Bolshevik government consented to Germany’s recognition of Georgia as “an independent state organism.”
On the other hand, the Georgian delegation took an unconstructive stance on the Russian question. Throughout 1919, Zurab Avalishvili (likely the only professional mediator and diplomat in the Georgian delegation) attempted to persuade his colleagues to establish working relationships with the representatives of anti-Soviet Russian leaders, hoping to resolve at least some of the major Russian-Georgian conflicts. However, the delegation, dominated by Georgian Social Democrats Chkheidze and Tsereteli, rejected Avalishvili’s advice, firmly believing that engaging with Russian imperialists would “put [Georgia] in conflict with all-European democracy.”
The mutual hostility between the Georgian and anti-Communist Russian representatives at the Paris Peace Conference ultimately proved detrimental to both parties and significantly contributed to the defeat of both the AFSR and the Georgian Republic by Soviet Russia in 1920-1921.
At the same time, it is worth mentioning that in 1919, the victorious Allies did not have a unified policy on the new state formations in the South Caucasus, largely due to their diverse geopolitical interests and, consequently, their varied approaches to the “Russian question,” which was closely tied to the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani issues.
France
Initially, the French government, under Georges Clemenceau, distanced itself from active involvement in the South Caucasus, as the region was not part of France’s primary sphere of interest. At the beginning of 1919, France’s focus was almost exclusively on economic relations with Georgia, with little attention given to the political situation in the region. On a broader scale, France sought a reliable ally to the east of Germany. Given the possibility that Berlin might seek to revise the terms of the Peace Treaty imposed by the Allies in 1919, France would face significant military pressure from Germany, a scenario that did become a reality in 1940. Thus, a stable, unified Russian state was of interest to French political elites, who were generally reluctant to support “separatist movements,” with the notable exception of Poland. Nevertheless, due to diligent Georgian diplomatic efforts, French-Georgian relations saw significant improvement by early 1920, although they were not particularly favorable to Georgia in early 1919.
United States
The U.S. approach to the territorial reorganization of pre-war possessions of the defeated nations differed from that of the European Allies, as it was primarily based on Wilsonian principles of “self-determination.” According to these principles, the populations of disputed territories should have the right to determine their own political futures. If these principles had been unequivocally adopted by the Conference, they could have posed a risk to Georgia, considering that by early 1919, some historical Georgian territories were inhabited by various minorities, including Armenians, Azeri Turks, and Ossetians. However, the European Allies were generally unwilling to apply these principles indiscriminately, and the Conference's decisions often ignored them.
By the fall of 1919, the Woodrow Wilson Administration proposed a U.S. mandate over Armenia and Georgia in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations of June 28, 1919. During discussions among the Georgian delegation at the Peace Conference, the question arose as to whether any foreign mandate could be compatible with independence. The mandate system was designed to place “colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” under temporary control of several “advanced nations.” Head of the Georgian delegation, Nicholas (Karlo) Chkheidze, argued that accepting the status of a former colony “not yet able to stand for itself” was humiliating. Conversely, Zurab Avalishvili pointed out that the Treaty of Poti with Germany had effectively placed the young Georgian democracy under German protection. Avalishvili was likely correct in asserting that an American or any other mandate could secure Georgia’s independence from Russia (whether Soviet or non-Soviet), but on May 29, 1920, the U.S. Senate “respectfully declined” President Wilson’s request for the mandate.
Following the failure of Wilson’s mandate proposal, the U.S. Government distanced itself from the problems of the East Mediterranean region, which was then referred to as “the Eastern Question.”
Italy
Almost simultaneously with the American mandate proposal for the South Caucasus republics, Italian political and business circles considered a similar project in the spring and summer of 1919. The idea of an Italian mandate over Georgia and the other two South Caucasus states appeared quite feasible until late June 1919, when the cabinet of Vittorio Orlando was replaced by that of Francesco Saverio Nitti. Despite the diligent efforts of the Georgian mission led by Konstantin Sabakhtarashvili, which had been sent to Rome in the fall of 1919, Nitti abandoned the idea of Italian involvement in the Caucasus.
Britain
In 1919-1920, Great Britain was arguably the most engaged Allied nation in Georgian affairs. As previously mentioned, under the “Anglo-French Convention” of December 23, 1917, the United Kingdom was responsible for the entire Caucasus, most of Southern Russia, and the Turkish Black Sea coast. During this period, the UK government and British Command in Constantinople extended considerable support to the de-facto independent states of the South Caucasus. This support was part of the British strategy to establish law and order in the periphery of the former Russian Empire “with the help of local elements, even if they were hostile to the idea of a unified Russia.” However, like the other Allied Powers, Britain continued to delay the official recognition of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan into early 1919.
The decision-making process regarding British intervention in South Russia and the South Caucasus from 1918-1920 was influenced by the partially conflicting approaches of three key British political leaders: Sir Winston Churchill (Minister of Munitions from July 1917 and Secretary of State for War from January 1919 to February 1921), Earl George Curzon of Kedleston (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1919 to January 1924), and David Lloyd George (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from December 1916 to October 1922).
Churchill was undoubtedly the most consistent and uncompromising supporter of the Russian anti-Bolshevik resistance. It was only with the final collapse of Baron Wrangel’s anti-Bolshevik "Russian Army" in Crimea on November 14, 1920, that Churchill’s hopes for the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime in Russia came to an end.
In contrast, Premier Lloyd George was more skeptical about the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces and the extent of British commitment to their cause. The defeat of the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces in late fall 1919 and their subsequent decline until March 1920 led Lloyd George and the British Cabinet to recognize that the unrecognized Bolsheviks were the only real rulers of Russia with whom the UK needed to negotiate.
Unlike Lloyd George and Churchill, Curzon, while no less anti-Bolshevik than Churchill, was less concerned with the internal situation in Russia and more focused on supporting the “Border States” of the Caucasus, including advocating for British military presence in the region. From Curzon’s perspective, the strategic importance of the South Caucasus for the British Empire lay in its geographical position, which could act as a “palisade” against potential Russian and Turkish expansion into the Middle East and India. Additionally, the region’s Apsheron oil fields, among the richest outside North America, were of significant interest.
The expansionist rhetoric of the Bolsheviks posed a threat that could potentially enhance the chances of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan gaining crucial British support if Curzon could persuade the Cabinet to maintain a British military and political presence in the South Caucasus. However, the unexpected fall of Baku on April 27-28, 1920, due to a surprise attack by the Soviet 11th Army against Azerbaijan, compromised Curzon’s strategy. This defeat undermined the idea of using the South Caucasian Border States as a buffer against Soviet expansion. The subsequent evacuation of British and French troops from Batum on July 9, 1920, marked the failure of Curzon’s policy towards the Caucasus, leaving the deteriorating South Caucasian republics—at that time only Armenia and Georgia—to their own fate.
The total collapse of Russian anti-Bolshevik forces in 1920 marked the end of the Allies' hopes for establishing a stable non-Soviet government in Russia. The Soviet military victories and aggressive rhetoric created a basis for Lord Curzon’s approach to the “Russian Question” to gain temporary traction. Consequently, on January 12, 1920, Georgia and Azerbaijan received de facto recognition from the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers. This recognition was a significant moral boost for both the Georgian government and its people, and it raised hopes for more substantial military and financial support from the Allies.
Indeed, discussions between Britain, France, and the South Caucasian states took place at the beginning of 1920, exploring the possibility of deploying additional Allied forces to the region. However, despite these discussions and the initial vocal support, Allied involvement in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan remained limited and did not extend much beyond rhetorical support. The complexities of the geopolitical landscape, combined with the challenges faced by the Allied powers, prevented substantial engagement and support for the South Caucasian republics.
The withdrawal of Allied support for the South Caucasus states was finally decided after the San Remo Conference (April 18-26, 1920), which marked a significant failure of Georgian diplomacy. During the conference, the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian delegations were advised by the Allied leadership to sign an agreement resolving all their disputed issues. However, the delegations of Armenia and Georgia failed to reach a consensus between themselves and with the British government, represented at the conference by Lord Robert Vansittart (British Foreign Office Assistant Secretary).
During the negotiations, chaired by Vansittart, the representatives of the South Caucasus republics appeared to resolve almost all disputed issues except for the ownership of the projected Kars-Batum railway (which, incidentally, was never built). The main stumbling block was the Armenian delegation's insistence on including a clause in the agreement stating that the section of the railway passing through Georgian territory would be "fully owned by the Armenian Republic." To his credit, Zurab Avalishvili, who had by then become a professional diplomat, tried to persuade the head of the Georgian delegation, Nikoloz Chkheidze, that this wording was not essential and should be accepted under the circumstances. However, Chkheidze did not heed this advice.
As a result, Lord Vansittart openly told the representatives of the three republics that he "washed his hands" of the matter and that they should not expect any serious assistance from the Allies any longer. These words were said on the night of April 23-24. Whether it was a mere coincidence or not, three days later, Soviet Russian troops crossed the border of Azerbaijan, and the next day, on April 28, 1920, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic fell. Months later, Soviet military aggression also targeted Armenia and Georgia, causing them to cease to exist as independent states.
In conclusion, I would like to mention another result of the international activity of the First Republic's diplomacy, namely the Moscow Treaty concluded between Georgia and Soviet Russia on May 7, 1920. As we know, Russia violated this treaty by attacking Georgia less than a year after it was signed. So should the conclusion of this treaty be considered a success or a failure of Georgian diplomacy? This is not an easy question...
Map 3
On one hand, this could be seen as a diplomatic success, as according to Articles I-IV of the above-mentioned treaty signed by Leо Karakhan (at that time, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) and Grigol Uratadze (Georgian plenipotentiary to Moscow), Soviet Russia unconditionally recognized the independence of the Georgian state and voluntarily agreed to refrain from interference in Georgia’s internal affairs as well as from all claims to her territory defined in subsequent articles. To be more specific, Articles III and IV of the Treaty of Moscow recognized as undeniably Georgian most of the territories that were under stable control of the Georgian state by the end of April 1920, as well as some disputed territories, which were under partial or no Georgian control at the time of its signing. That included “in addition to the parts of Chernomorsky province [Black Sea province] transferred to Georgia in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article III of the present treaty, the following provinces and territories of the former Russian Empire: Tiflis, Kutais and Batum with all districts forming the said provinces and territories, and, in addition, the districts of Zakatala and Sukhum.” (See Map 3).
The signature of Russia under the first four articles of the said Treaty was undoubtedly of great importance, especially for facilitating de jure recognition of Georgia by the Allied powers, which was granted on January 26, 1921. That made Georgia one of only six nations that were given such recognition after their secession from Russia at the end of World War I.
However, on the other hand, Articles V and X of the Treaty, in fact, nullified Article II which presumed non-interference of Soviet Russia in Georgia's domestic policy. And what is the most important - the treaty failed to prevent subsequent aggression and the occupation of Georgia by Soviet Russia in February 1921. Therefore, although the signing of the treaty provided short-term relief and formal recognition, its violation and the ensuing events demonstrated that these achievements were temporary and illusory.
Ironically, on February 25, when the first Georgian ambassador to France Akaki Chkhenkeli was presenting his credentials at the Presidential Palace in Paris, the fierce battle for Tbilisi was coming to its bitter end and the Georgian troops, embattled and outnumbered by the enemy, were given an order to retreat, leaving the Georgian capital to the Soviets. The war, during which only France provided some military assistance to Georgia, lasted until March 17, 1921, when in view of the loss of 90% of Georgian territory to the Soviets and Kemalists, the national government and military leadership of Georgia, along with thousands of soldiers and civilians, boarded two French and one Italian ships to leave into exile. Three days later, in Tiflis, the Parliament of Georgia was dissolved by the decree of the “Revolutionary Committee,” thus ending any hopes for Georgian independence for the next 70 years.
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